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"THERE HAVE TO BE FOUR"
FRANK I. MICHELMAN*
I. THE GOOD OLD DAYS
It is with huge delight and satisfaction that I join the company
paying tribute to Guido Calabresi. There is, however, a bit of ahangup, disclosed by Dean Rothenberg's description of this Sympo-
sium as a gathering of scholars in the fields of torts and of law and
economics. In neither of those crowds do I fit. When it comes to
current, advanced discussion of the economic ramifications of tortlaw-the field of debate that The Costs of Accidents1 has done so much
to organize and to anchor-I have nothing to contribute beyond pos-
sibly comic relief, assuming anyone could imagine me being funny.
In fact, I do feel like the joker in the deck of speakers at this gather-
ing. I mean, no organizer, I'll bet, has the remotest idea of what I am
going to talk about.
To be honest, I have had to scrounge a little for a topic. This
event celebrates The Costs of Accidents. Even so, I soon shall be turning
my remarks to another Calabresi classic, the great and famous Cathe-
dral article in the Harvard Law Review that Guido co-authored in 1972
with A. Douglas Melamed.2 On reflection, I think it probably was
scripted that I should do this. The organizers of this event-or couldit have been some fine Italian hand behind the scenes?-decided that
I should be here, and I have a pretty good suspicion about why. For
there is a palpable reason for my participating in a celebration of TheCosts of Accidents, and it is that very reason that turns my thought to-
ward The Cathedral, which is connected to that reason in a kind of
genealogical way.
The story starts somewhere in 1967 or 1968, when we were very
young. I had published an article that included what I suppose couldbe called (for those days, anyway) an economic analysis of the prob-lem that later came to be called "regulatory taking."3 Not long after
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I thank David Barron
and Yochai Benkler for their very helpful comments.
1. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
2. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter The Cathedral].3. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
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that article appeared, I received a letter from a rising star at the Yale
Law School saying kind things about it. Guido Calabresi was a man I
had never met, but of whom I had heard wondrous things, and I was
very pleased to have gained his approval. A year or so later, Guido
came to Harvard Law School for a turn as visiting professor, and we
formed a friendship.
The Costs of Accidents appeared in 1970, and of course the editors
of the Yale Law Journal wanted a review. I guess because of my 1967
article, they came to me, and of course I could not pass up that invita-
tion. I was not a torts scholar, though. My common-law field was
property.4 Being a property man, I conceived the idea of devoting a
big hunk of my review of The Costs of Accidents to seeing what could be
learned about private nuisance law-particularly private nuisance law
regarded as an instrument of pollution control-by looking at it
through the analytical prism developed by Calabresi in The Costs of
Accidents.5
You have to remember that this was a time when probably the
leading idea in the legal academy, in the then quite primitive environ-
mental field, was Pigovian, not Coasean. It was that the legal system's
prime contribution to holding emissions to optimal levels would lie in
internalizing all the costs of emissions to emitters.
6 Along with that
idea had come an interest in building private nuisance litigation into
a major engine of that policy-with nuisance being conceived, of
course, or reconceived, as a strict liability tort.
7 It was obvious to me
that the arguments and analyses developed in Calabresi's book-start-
ing with a list of "myths" that Guido provided'-would seriously com-
plicate that approach, and in my review I labored to work out some of
the implications.
As I got going, I had an epiphany9 (well, for a property man it was
an epiphany). The term "accident" denotes a certain class of costly
interactions. So does the term "pollution." There is an obvious way in
which the two classes appear to differ. It is in the nature of an acci-
4. Compare the opening line of The Cathedral "Only rarely are Property and Torts
approached from a unified perspective." Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 
2,
at 1089. Thirty-odd years after publication of the first edition of Judge Posner's treatise,
that remark is ancient history. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1972).
5. See Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666-86 (1971) (book review) [hereinafter Pollution as a Tort].
6. See id. at 667-68 & nn.32-
3 3
.
7. See id. at 667.
8. See id. at 649-50, 667; THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 17-23 (discussing,
e.g., the myth that our society is "committed to preserving life at any cost").
9. See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, supra note 5, at 666-67, 669-70.
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dent that you can't prevent it by ordering the parties in advance not to
have it. If you could, it wouldn't be an accident.'0 By contrast, not
only can you know in advance that you have a good reason for wanting
an emission of some kind not to happen, but when you do know that,
you quite rationally can pursue your aim by issuing a prohibitory di-
rective against the undesired emissions. Insert that into the setting of
private litigation and what you get is this: Injunctions, which are more
or less beside the point in accident litigation, are a kind of remedy
bound to demand serious consideration in many pollution cases.
With that brilliant flash of insight at hand, I produced, in my
review (not all that originally, as I soon was to learn"l), a threefold
typology of right/remedy combinations-I called them "liability deci-
sions" 12-for private-nuisance controversies: First, the defendant
might be held liable to have its conduct enjoined at an aggrieved
neighbor's behest; second, the defendant might be held liable to such
a plaintiff, but only to judgments for compensatory damages; t" third,
the defendant's conduct might not give rise to any sort of legal liabil-
ity to any plaintiff. 4
Defendant Liable to injunction against emissions (Rule 1)
to damages for emissions (Rule 2)
Defendant Not Liable case dismissed (Rule 3)
TABLE A
10. When defined activities are found to be unacceptably dangerous or accident-prone,governments-for that reason-can enact punishable prohibitions against engagement in
such activities. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1097 n.19(giving as an example a prohibition on selling cars of more than a certain horsepower).When an infraction of such a prohibition is found to be legally causative of an accident, a
court-possibly at legislative direction-can treat the fact of infraction as a more or less
conclusive ground for holding the violator civilly liable for the resultant costs ("negligenceper se," for example). Imposition of civil liability then can be construed as a form of
sanction for violation of the prohibitory rules, or it can be explained on other grounds(such as fairness between the parties), but it cannot well be regarded as a sanction for
violating an order not to have an accident. Cf id. at 1108-09 (explaining the extreme
economic undesirability of a general "property entitlement not to be accidentally
injured").
11. See id. at 1115-16 & n.53 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 157-215(1965) for a "traditional," three-rule view).
12. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, supra note 5, at 670.13. I did not consider the possibility of "supracompensatory" damages, see Henry E.Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719, 1750-51 (2004) [hereinafter Prop-
erty Rules], and how that option might fit into the Calabresian scheme.
14. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, supra note 5, at 670. I have rearranged the order in
which I stated the three variations in order to conform my numeration to that which TheCathedral would later employ. See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral supra note 2, at 115-
16; infra Table B1.
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I did not say specifically what the remedial consequence would be
of finding the defendant nonliable, but obviously I meant that any
case brought against a nonliable defendant would be dismissed. I did
mention that, on Calabresian principles concerned with allocative effi-
ciency, any defendant's liability-whether to injunctions or to dam-
ages-normally would be releasable by plaintiffs and potential
plaintiffs in freely bargained transactions.
15 In my review, I tried to
bring to bear on the choice among my three alternatives-case dis-
missed, releasable liability to injunction, releasable liability to dam-
ages-the full array of Calabresian categories and analyses: primary
versus secondary versus tertiary costs, general versus specific deter-
rence, collectivized versus decentralized assessments of costs, cheapest
cost avoider versus best briber; in short, the whole shebang.
Now I have to pick up a second strand of the story. My review
appeared in 1971, and shortly thereafter I again got a letter from an
interested reader. This time, the letter was not from Guido Calabresi,
it was from Richard Posner, with whose own review of Guido's
book 1 6-it had come out before my review was done-mine had ex-
pressed some disagreement.1 7 I haven't tried to recover the details,
but Professor Posner (as he then was) and I got launched into an
exchange of letters that went on for three or four rounds, with carbon
copies (remember them?) going to Guido. At some point, Guido
wrote a letter to both of us commenting on our exchange.
Recently, I was able to exhume my copy of Guido's letter from
long-neglected files buried in a sub-basement area of the Harvard Law
School. I went digging for the letter because of something I thought I
remembered it contained. And, yes, just as I thought, Guido's letter
does include a comment about my review's array of three "rules deal-
ing with nuisance law."1" This was June of 1971. Guido wrote that I
was wrong about the number three. He declared, and I quote: "There
have to be four and they are, in theory, completely symmetrical."
19
Guido added that this claim would be the subject of an article he
15. See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, supra note 5, at 670. In the present Essay, I set
aside possible "inalienability rules," see Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at
1111-15, for a reason soon to be mentioned. See infta note 22.
16. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 636 (1970).
17. See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, supra note 5, at 660 & n.25 (taking issue with
Posner's objection to Calabresi's inattention to the matter of empirical support for his
theoretical analysis).
18. Letter from Guido Calabresi to Richard Posner and Frank Michelman 2 (June 7,
1971) (quoted with the kind permission of Judge Guido Calabresi) (on file with author).
19. Id. Guido went on to say that "on certain assumptions of perfect cost knowledge,
the four reduce to two." Id.
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planned to work on over the coming summer. Needless to say, that
turned out to be the article we now know as The Cathedral, which came
out in the Harvard Law Review in April of 1972. Twenty-five years later,
speaking at a retrospect held at the Yale Law School, Guido said that
my review of The Costs of Accidents "gave inspiration" to The Cathedral20
That certainly is a thought pleasing to me, but I must say that our
correspondence is evidence that the idea had taken root in Guido's
mind at some time prior to my review's appearance.
II. FROM THREE TO FIVE
A. Setting the Table
So much for reminiscence. It is time to get serious. I have a bone
to pick with Calabresi and Melamed over the number of possible "lia-bility decisions" (my term) or "rules" (their term) for private nuisance
litigation.
Guido had written to me that my number, three, was wrong.There have to be four, he said, calling symmetry to his support. From
The Cathedral, we can surmise that the thought guiding this remark
was one of a fourfold table, two columns intersected by two rows.21The columns would come to be headed "Plaintiff's Entitlement" and
"Defendant's Entitlement." The rows would come to be headed "Pro-
tected by a Property Rule" and "Protected by a Liability Rule. '22 Two
times two is four, not three. Nevertheless, on reflection (a tad be-lated, I admit), I have come to believe that my naive "three" was closer
to the truth than The Cathedrals scientific "four." Explaining why is
the task of what follows.
20. Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201,
2203 (1997) [hereinafter Simple Virtues].
21. In a recent article, Henry Smith describes Calabresi and Melamed's positing of
what they called the "fourth rule" (the one they added to my three) as an act of "purelytheoretical prediction." See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nui-
sance, 90 VA. L. REv. 965, 1009 (2004) [hereinafter Exclusion]. Smith means it was an infer-
ence from a conceptual model: four cells, four rules.22. I am sidestepping "Protected by an Inalienability Rule" because doing so is alreadyimplicit in Guido's number, four. See also Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note2, at 1106 (noting the tight interdependence of property rules and liability rules and theseparate discussability of inalienability). In The Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed credited
my review of The Costs of Accidents with having noticed the inalienability-rule possibility. Seeid. at 1116 n.53 (citing Michelman, Pollution as a Tort, supra note 5, at 684). From today'sdistance, their acknowledgment looks generous to me. See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort,
supra note 5, at 684 (speculating that "extreme-sounding" rules, such as "all pollution
should be stopped .... irrespective of how the measurable costs of compliance compare
with those of non-compliance" might be justified in economic terms as a way to take ac-
count of a real social cost of uncertainty).
[VOL. 64:136
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Immediately, I need to state with greatest care what I mean by
"closer to the truth." I mean closer to the immanent truth of the Ca-
thedral construction as originally offered and taken on its own terms;
taken, that is, as an expression of a particular "way of looking at...
legal problems,' 23 filtered through a particular policy-analytic screen,
that of Calabresi and Melamed, circa 1972. What follows-I must em-
phasize-is written in a time warp, virtually walled off from thirty-odd
years' worth of follow-on work by gifted scholars proposing exten-
sions, elaborations, refinements, corrections, and critiques of the orig-
inal model's simple schematizations and supporting, policy-analytic
argumentation. 24  Calabresi and Melamed framed the original con-
struction as they did in order to convey the basics of their policy-ana-
lytic outlook in a simple and transparent manner.25 What recently has
struck me, though, is that their patented, fourfold framing cannot log-
ically be maintained.26 By that statement I do not mean merely that
the initial framing overlooks or suppresses some additional number of
logically possible (and maybe practically significant) elementary
"rules" for the assignment and form of protection of entitlements, as
later writers have contended.27 I mean something stronger: that The
Cathedra's simple, two-by-two frame, taken on its own terms, harbors a
contradiction-is, in fact, incoherent.
The defect, I shall go on to suggest, is curable. The table can be
fixed by redrawing it so as to divide cleanly two questions-those of
"liability" assignment and "entitlement" assignment-that the origi-
nal, fourfold frame dumps together. Thus, a modest fix-up to The Ca-
thedrals simple model is sufficient to restore its consistency and
23. See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral supra note 2, at 1089 n.2.
24. A scattering of such works are mentioned below. More extensive references to
leading works in the field can be found in a pair of recent contributions by Henry Smith.
See generally Smith, Exclusion, supra note 21; Smith, Property Rules, supra note 13. I proceed
thus, in studied disregard of most of latter-day Cathedral-science, not because I make any
assumption that the architecture envisioned by Calabresi and Melamed cannot be im-
proved upon, but rather because my purposes here-to disclose a logical defect in their
scheme and to make apparent something unexpected about the scheme's own latent struc-
ture once the defect is cleared-require that I treat the scheme from a vantage point as
close to identical with theirs as I can make it.
25. See Calabresi, Simple Virtues, supra note 20, at 2202 (explaining the simplicity of the
model as an invitation to comprehension).
26. I am not the first to notice. SeeJames E. Krier & StewartJ. Schwab, Property Rules
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 440 (1995) (discussed
infta notes 43, 46, 61).
27. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design
of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6 (2001) (tendering six rules); Krier & Schwab, supra
note 26, at 470-75 (proposing and explaining a "reverse-reverse damages" rule); Madeline
Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 847 (1993) (tendering twelve
rules that pass a coherence test).
2005]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
coherence. But-and here is my bottom line-when the needed re-
pairs are made and the "true" table stands revealed, its key, organizing
number is seen to be not four (or two2") but rather three.
I begin with a reprise of The Cathedral's cogent case for adding a
fourth rule to my three. Next, I get my critique rolling by raising the
bid by one, to five. I expect you will see how disruptive a bid of five
could be. If I can show you five rules, none of them rejectable without
contradiction by Calabresi and Melamed, then the implicit theorem
of The Cathedral, that an entire world of relevant possibilities can be
captured by cross-hatching two, dichotomous dimensions-Which
party has the entitlement? What is the form of its protection?-must
be fundamentally incomplete.
B. Getting to Four
Picture, then, The Cathedral's fourfold table. By the way, I should
mention that the table is only implicit in the Cathedral article; no
graphic table appears there (typewriters, remember). But picture the
table: two columns, entitlement in P-for-plaintiff, entitlement in D-for-
defendant; two rows, entitlement protected by a property rule, entitle-
ment protected by a liability rule. Here is how I picture it:
Plaintiff's Entitlement Defendant's Entitlement
Protected by a P gets injunction vs. P's case against D dismissed
Property Rule spillover activity on D's land (Rule 3)
(Rule 1)
Protected by a D pays P damages for
Liability Rule spillover activity on D's land
(Rule 2)
TABLE BI
In speaking of an "entitlement" being either in P or in D, the
Cathedral authors had in mind approximately what Wesley Hohfeld
would have meant.29 To be more exact, their term covers the pair of
advantageous 'jural relations" that Hohfeld denominated "rights"(often nowadays called "claim-rights") and "privileges."' 0 In every liti-
28. See supra note 19.
29. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
inJudicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). According to Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 380 (2001), The
Cathedral uses "entitlement" to name "the conception of property that is implicit in
Coase"-by which they mean a "bundle-of-rights" conception that they trace to Hohfeld.
See id. at 365-66.
30. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 30-33; Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note
2, at 1090 ("The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is ... the problem of
[VOL. 64:136
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gated case, some more-or-less particularly described kind of conduct
on the defendant's part is at issue. For example, in a given case, the
disputed conduct might be emissions of volumes of sooty smoke that
interfere substantially with neighboring land uses. For convenience,
we'll give the targeted conduct the name "x-pollution." The expres-
sion "x-pollution" designates emissions of smoke of a certain charac-
ter, at levels of frequency and intensity exceeding certain ceilings,
occurrent on land owned by D and resulting in effects of a certain,
detrimental character on land owned by others. Once a dispute over
this category of land-linked activity arrives in court, the court, inescap-
ably, has to assign the relevant entitlement either to D or, alterna-
tively, to each of a number of nearby landowners; call them "A. In
what follows, bearing in mind that there may be quite a number of
aggrieved neighbors, I am going to refer to them by the singular name
-p.,,
Suppose the relevant entitlement over x-pollution is assigned to
P. It will have the form, then, of a Hohfeldian claim-right, held by P
against D, that D not conduct on his land (or responsibly permit
others to conduct on his land) the indexed category of activity. This
means that if D conducts such activity, he has committed a legally con-
,entitlement.' . . . The entitlement to make noise versus the entitlement to have silence,
the entitlement to pollute versus the entitlement to breathe clean air . . .- these are the
first order of legal decisions."); Smith, Property Rules, supra note 13, at 1793 (speaking of
"the sense [in which] the Coasean approach as developed in the liability rule literature
follows in Hohfeld's footsteps"). Some reservations are called for. First, Calabresi and
Melamed never expressly invoked the Hohfeldian tradition. Second, Calabresi and
Melamed's lingo of "protected by" is non-Hohfeldian. Strict followers of Hohfeld would be
barred from talking that talk. Expressions such as "protected by a liability [property, ina-
lienability] rule" are not parts of the elementary Hohfeldian lexicon, which is supposed to
be sufficient to the description of all legal relations. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 19-20
(tendering an analysis of "jural relations in general," of "the basic conceptions of the law,"
and of "the legal elements that enter into all types of jural interests"). Analysts strictly
committed to the Hohfeldian game, and wishing to mention the various legal relations
designated by "protected by a __ rule" in terms of that game, presumably would try to do
it by attributing to the involved parties apt concatenations of "powers," "liabilities," "immu-
nities," and "disabilities," but it is not clear that they could succeed. See Morris, supra note
27, at 842 (maintaining that "property," "liability," and "inalienability" rules name three
different classes of entitlements, as opposed to three different ways of modifying one class
of entitlements); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1344-46, 1369 (1986) ("In the economic conception of them, property and
liability rules protect rights. We have argued that they do not, that instead they specify the
content of rights over the transactional domain."); Smith, Property Rules, supra note 13, at
1749 ("Property rules and liability rules are properly thought of as different ways of defin-
ing the scope of entitlements in the domain of transfer, rather than simply as 'remedies'
protecting entitlements.").
31. SeeCalabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1100 ("[A]n entitlement to
a good or to its converse is essentially inevitable.").
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sequential wrong against P. If, per contra, the relevant entitlement is
assigned to D, then its form will be that of a Hohfeldian privilege on
D's part to conduct x-pollution on his land, meaning that his doing so
is not a legally consequential wrong to any P in the picture.12
Notice, next, that either of those two possible, initial assignments
of the entitlement is convertible into the other by exchange. If P ini-
tially is assigned a claim-right over x-pollution, P can grant D an "af-
firmative easement" to x-pollute, which would amount to a
replacement of P's claim-right with D's congruent privilege.33 If D is
initially assigned a privilege over x-pollution, D could grant P a restric-
tive "real covenant" (or "covenant running with the land") investing P
with access to ajudicial remedy in case of x-pollution occurrent on D's
land, thus replacing D's privilege with P's congruent claim-right.34 In
the vocabulary of The Cathedral, the initially assigned entitlement is
protected by a property rule if its conversion by transfer can be
brought about only on terms, if any, that both parties agree to; in
other words, the initial assignee of the entitlement can name his price
for reassignment. 5 The initially assigned entitlement is protected by
a liability rule if the initially non-entitled party can effectively gain the
entitlement, regardless of the consent of the initially entitled party, by
paying an amount of compensation determined by a court or similar
arbiter.3 (Think of eminent domain.37 ) Thus, if P holds the entitle-
ment initially as a claim-right, and it is protected by a property rule,
that means that P can secure injunctions against x-pollution occurrent
on D's land, unless and until P releases the entitlement to D in ex-
change for a price offer from D that is acceptable to P. If P's claim-
right is protected only by a liability rule, P will be restricted to actions
for damages-in effect, freeing D to x-pollute at a price that the court
decides will compensate P adequately for the resulting burden or loss.
If, conversely, D holds the entitlement initially as a privilege, P simply
has no cause of action against D, so if P wants relief against D's x-
32. Commentators have sometimes construed The Cathedra's notion of a property-rule-
protected entitlement in D to encompass a claim-right of D against P. See Coleman &
Kraus, supranote 30, at 1338 ("[I]f the court decides in favor of the polluter, it may protect
its right to pollute by a property rule .... which enjoins [P] from reducing [D's] pollution
without first securing [D's] consent."). I have found it more natural to construe their
notion of D's entitlement-protected-by-a-property-rule as a naked privilege vis-A-vis P. Ac-
cord Smith, Exclusion, supra note 21, at 1008-09. This point will be significant below. See
infra text following note 45; text accompanying and following note 61.
33. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUcrION TO PROPERTY 170-71 (2001).
34. See, e.g., id.
35. Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1092.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1093, 1106-08 (using eminent domain to exemplify liability rules).
[VOL. 64:136
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polluting, Pwill have to buy that relief from D at a mutually acceptable
price.
That was as far as the analysis went in my review of The Costs of
Accidents. Three possibilities: P gets an injunction against x-pollution
on D's land, P gets damages for x-pollution on D's land, P s suit against
D is dismissed. 8 But Calabresi and Melamed, having set up their two-
by-two table, were able to point out that something must be missing.
39
Plaintiff's Entitlement Defendant's Entitlement
Protected by a injunction vs. x-pollution case dismissed (Rule 3)
Property Rule on D's land (Rule 1)
Protected by a damages for x-pollution on [something missing]
Liability Rule D's land (Rule 2)
TABLE B2
"Missing," they said, "is a fourth rule representing an entitlement
in [D] to [x-pollute], but an entitlement which is protected only by a
liability rule."4 °
What this would mean in practice, they said, is that P can "stop" x-
pollution on D's land, but only on condition that P pays to D an
amount sufficient to compensate D for any resulting wealth loss, that
amount to be determined by the court 4 -a form of remedy that be-
came known to the literature as a "compensated injunction."
'4 2
38. See supra Table A.
39. Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1116.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. E.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 738 & n.202 (1973); see Smith, Exclusion, supra
note 21, at 1009 & n.137 (crediting Ellickson with introducing the term "compensated
injunction"). In their statements of Rule 4 in The Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed did
not speak specifically of a compensated injunction, but they did, with seeming equivalence,
speak of empowering plaintiffs to "stop" defendants from polluting. Calabresi & Melamed,
The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1116, 1120. In his 1997 recollection, Douglas Melamed re-
ported that "Rule 4 is alive and well-at least in Washington." A. Douglas Melamed, Re-
marks: A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE L.J. 2209, 2209 (1997). He meant that Rule-4-type
solutions could be found in public-law settings in which statutes and administrative rulings
stand in for common-law adjudication and the government stands in for private plaintiffs.
All of the instances adduced by Melamed involved the government receiving from the
private actor, in return for compensation flowing from the government to the actor, a
permanent stoppage of the actor's targeted activity. See id. at 2209-10. My reason for
stressing this point will appear soon below.
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Plaintiffs Entitlement Defendant's Entitlement
Protected by a injunction against x- case dismissed (Rule 3)
Property Rule pollution on D's land
(Rule 1)
Protected by a damages for x-pollution on compensated injunction
Liability Rule D's land (Rule 2) (Rule 4)
TABLE B3
C. Getting to Five
I put it to you that, once we have come this far, it is obvious that
something still is missing. Here we are, in the lower-right cell of the
fourfold table: entitlement in D, protected by a liability rule. "Pro-
tected by a liability rule" means not protected by a property rule. It
means that D may be required to put up with the negation of his enti-
tlement-he may be required to put up with the conversion of his
erstwhile Hohfeldian privilege to x-pollute, into Ps claim-right against
x-pollution-in exchange forjudicially assessed compensation from P.
But notice that, by Calabresi and Melamed's own analysis, such a nega-
tion of privilege could imply either of two forms of future judicial
remediation against D's possible x-pollution" The court could ne-
gate D's privilege by placing D under pain of contempt sanctions for
future emissions, in other words by issuing a permanent injunction
against D's future emissions for the issuance of which P will have to
compensate D in the amount set by the court. That is Calabresi and
Melamed's Rule 4 as widely understood. But the court also could ne-
gate D's privilege by skipping the injunction and, instead, stripping D
of his immunity against future suits for damages by P, for which act of
judicial stripping P will have to compensate D ex ante for expected,
resulting net-worth loss, in a lump-sum amount to be assessed by the
court. This is Michelman's Rule 5.44
43. Cf Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 468 ("[R]ule four is paradoxical in that it
reintroduces the very problem it is meant to solve.").
. 44. Rule 5 is no more readily dismissible as merely theoretical than Rule 4 is. Calabresi
and Melamed have argued that Rule 4 will fit some situations aptly, and will sometimes be
approximated by public-law solutions that break the mold of the private lawsuit. See Cala-
bresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1117, 1122-23 & n.62; Calabresi, Simple
Virtues, supra note 20, at 2204; Melamed, supra note 42, at 2209-10. Just so may I argue that
Rule 5 demands recognition as a genuine possibility that conceivably might have its uses. I
will mention here one fairly obvious, Calabresian sort of reason for considering that a
compensated judicial negation of D's initially assigned privilege may sometimes be better
cast in the form of exposing D to a series of future damages judgments or compensatory
fines than in the form of a releasable, absolute ban against emissions. As between Pand D,
the court may have not a clue, ex ante, about which will prove to be the cheaper cost
avoider, and exposing D to a future stream of damages liabilities may be, in some circum-
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Plaintiffs Entitlement Defendant's Entitlement
Protected by a injunction against x- case dismissed (Rule 3)
Property Rule pollution on D's land
(Rule 1)
Protected by a damages for x-pollution on compensated restrictive real






Both Calabresi and Melamed's Rule 4 and Michelman's Rule 5
contemplate a forced sale by D to P, at a judicially determined price,
of a servitude or "restrictive real covenant" barring x-pollution on D's
land. The difference is that Rule 4 contemplates a specifically en-
forceable covenant, whereas Rule 5 contemplates a covenant enforce-
able only by collection of damages for breach. Calabresi and
Melamed are committed to count these two variations as two "rules,"
not just one. They count for two when they appear on the "Plaintiff's
Entitlement" side of the ledger, so how can they not count for two
when they appear on the "Defendant's Entitlement" side?
III. GETrING TO SIx
A. Diagnosis: Conflation of Entitlement Assignment with Liability
Assignment
We are left, it seems, with an asymmetrical result.4 5 Pace Cala-
bresi and Melamed, it appears that /Ps possible claim-right entitle-
ment and D's conversely possible privilege entitlement are not
symmetrical with respect to the number of their possible remedial en-
tailments. In the world of The Cathedral, possible remedial entailments
of "P has a claim-right" (we are oversimplifying here, but harmlessly)
are of two types: specific and compensatory, injunction and damages.
By contrast, the remedial entailment of "D has a privilege" is one and
one only: case dismissed. (You will notice, please, that two plus one is
three, not four.)
stances, the choice that will economize on the sum of information costs, transaction costs,
and their correlative error costs. Cf Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at
1120-21 ("[T]he assessment of the objective damage to Taney from [forgoing] his pollu-
tion may be cheap and so might the assessment of the relative benefits to all Marshalls of
such freedom from pollution. But the opposite may also be the case.").
45. See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 21, at 1009, 1012-13 (pointing out how the align-
ment of Ps and D's entitlements in nuisance cases is "asymmetric," contrary to Calabresi
and Melamed's claim of symmetry).
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Something has gone wrong with the table. Calabresi and
Melamed, it seems, did not notice how their Rule 4 attacks the table's
ostensible principle of left/right division, according to which the left
side is reserved for solutions in which plaintiff has the entitlement and
the right side is for solutions in which defendant has the entitlement.
The Cathedral authors never mentioned that their Rule 4 is a mutant
form-involving, as it does, a transformation of D's privilege into Ps
claim-right-that opens the right-hand side of the table to invasion by
the left-hand side.46
To help us gain a clearer grip on what is going on here, I want to
introduce a bit of Calabresian terminology from The Costs of Accidents.
In that book, Calabresi used the expression "is liable"-as in "defen-
dant is liable" and "plaintiff is liable"-in an illuminating way. To be
"liable" there meant to be the one of the interacting parties who will
be required to bear the costs of the interaction between them that is
the subject of the lawsuit. In this supple terminology, plaintiffs as well
as defendants can be held liable. 47 A plaintiff always is a party to an
interaction who will bear certain costs of the interaction if he cannot
succeed in shifting them to a defendant by the means of a lawsuit.
Accordingly, a court imposes liability on a plaintiff by the simple
means of denying that plaintiff any civil legal remedy against any de-
fendant, thereby leaving the costs on the plaintiff, where they fell.
The Costs of Accidents considers at length, and The Cathedral treats
more briefly, the sorts of reasons a court might have for deciding that
a particular party or parties, out of two or more plausible contenders,
should be the one or ones to be held liable in this cost-bearing sense
of the term. In no case, of course, is it possible for a court, or the law,
simply to avoid this choice.4" Among the possibly decisive considera-
tions for casting it one way or the other are moralistic reasons of dis-
tributive or corrective justice, including reasons of responsibility and
fault.49 However, the list of possibly decisive considerations does not
end there-nor does it really even begin there in the Cathedral view.
The Cathedral teaches that judges concerned solely with allocative effi-
46. Cf Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 470 ("Rule four entails what aptly can be
called reverse damages, since in such cases nominal plaintiffs end up liable to nominal
defendants.").
47. See, e.g., THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 137 ("If pedestrians [injured by
cars that hit them] were held liable, they would bear $100 in accident costs.").
48. See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral supra note 2, at 1091 ("When a loss is left
where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God so ordained it. Rather it is because
the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free of liability .... ").
49. See id. at 1098 & n.21 (distinguishing between "distributive" and "corrective" justice
and treating both as falling under a broader head of distributional "goals" or "concerns").
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ciency can always derive from that aim a nonarbitrary basis for assign-
ment of cost-bearing responsibilities among parties to various classes
of costly interactions. Efficiency-focused considerations of "general
deterrence,"50 loss spreading,51 and minimization of administrative
costs, in some combination, can always be summoned to guide and to
explain such judicial choices.52 Such choices, therefore, can always be
defended as reasoned or nonarbitrary without any need to bring in
extra-economic considerations of justice.5 3 Even granting that distri-
butional and "other justice" factors54 demand attention in their own
right-and The Cathedrals view is that, inevitably, they do 55 -the fact
remains that efficiency considerations will always be sufficient to de-
cide liability assignments, as a default. The result is that, given any
instance of a judicial assignment of cost-bearing liability to P or to D,
we as observers may be quite unable to say with certainty whether that
assignment is based strictly on a judicial calculus of efficiency, or is
based strictly on judicially perceived demands of a justice beyond effi-
ciency, or is based on some conjunction of the two.
For purposes of my argument here, it does not matter. All that
matters is a point that I am not the first to make, to wit: Judicial as-
signments of liability-regardless of whether driven by efficiency con-
cerns, by distributional concerns, or by "other justice" concerns-are
fully detachable from judicial assignments of entitlement going for-
ward in time from the date of the judgment.56 As we have seen, the
famous Rule 4 proves the point. Rule 4 vests the contested entitle-
50. See THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 69 (using the term "general deter-
rence" to denote the disciplinary effect on harm-producing activities of forcing people to
choose between (a) engaging in such activities and bearing the resultant costs, and (b)
avoiding the costs by avoiding the activity-in other words, the array of methods repre-
sented by widely applicable tort doctrines of strict liability, negligence liability, contribu-
tory and comparative negligence defenses, etc.).
51. See id. at 39 (introducing reasons for believing that costs often can be lightened by
spreading them or by funneling them to those with relatively greater financial resources).
52. If other efficiency-based considerations are indecisive, efficiency then favors leaving
liability where it fell, on the plaintiff, because shifting liability via litigation is costly. See
Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedra supra note 2, at 1093.
53. See id at 1096-97 (summarizing a series of five efficiency-focused guidelines for set-
ting entitlements in accident law); id. at 1118-21 (showing how, in the pollution context, a
choice among Rules 1-4 may be fully determined by efficiency considerations, prior to any
"introduction of distributional considerations").
54. See id. at 1102-05 (raising and analyzing the possibility that there are valid consider-
ations bearing on assignments of entitlement and liability that are distinct from both effi-
ciency and distributional concerns).
55. See id. at 1098 ("Difficult as wealth distribution preferences are to analyze, it should
be obvious that they play a crucial role in the setting of entitlements.").
56. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 27, at 8-9 (emphasizing thatjudges can "decouple"
allocative and distributive goals); Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 467 (noting how Rule 4
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ment in the plaintiff as a claim-right, even as the Rule's attendant de-
mand for compensation of the defendant by the plaintiff is explicable
only in terms of a judicial determination that the plaintiff, not the
defendant, is the one who should be held liable to bear the costs of
their interaction. Rule 4, in other words, is a case of entitlement as-
signment decidedly detached from liability assignment.
In setting up The Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed used the lan-
guage of entitlement-assignment to name the columns in their table.
I am making bold to suggest that this was a slip of the pen and what
they really were thinking about was liability assignment. That would
explain why they did not notice how the insertion of Rule 4 in the
lower-right cell contradicts the nominal reservation of the right-hand
side for "entitlement in D." The contradiction evaporates-although
you may glimpse another difficulty arising in its place 57-if we let Col-
umn Left be for "D is liable, so P is not" while Column Right is for "P is
liable, so D is not" (it being assumed that one or the other of P and D
is the one who, for some good and sufficient reason, should be made
to shoulder the costs).5 8
D's Liability - P's Liability =
P's Nonliability D's Nonliability
Protected by a injunction against x- case dismissed (Rule 3)
Property Rule pollution on D's land
(Rule 1)
Protected by a damages for x-pollution on compensated restrictive real






P is the party upon whom the costs of the interaction currently
rest (the neighbor choking on the factory smoke), who would be try-
ing to shift these costs to D by the means of a lawsuit. One immedi-
ately perceives that, whenever the court decides that P is nonliable-
in other words, that D is the one who ought in all reason to bear the
allows for assigning the entitlement with a view to minimizing transaction costs while also
accommodating a "justice preference" for the polluter).
57. See infra text following Table El.
58. Making this substitution has the further advantage of idling the objection that lia-
bility rules impair entitlements rather than "protect" them, insofar as the notion of entitle-
ment connotes autonomous disposition over the fate of an asset. See Morris, supra note 27,
at 842 & n.51 (citing Coleman & Kraus, supra note 30, at 1338-39).
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costs-it will have to assign a relevant entitlement to Pin the form of a
claim-right. Lacking a claim-right, P would have no legal footing
upon which to approach a court for cost-shifting. The court still must
choose, though, between protecting P's claim-right by a property rule
or by a liability rule. It can give Pan injunction or it can restrict her to
damages. Since the court can do either, it must choose between these
available alternatives, on the basis of some set of criteria the court
takes to be controlling-just as the court must already have assigned
cost-bearing liability to D on the basis of some supposedly applicable
set of criteria.59
Now suppose the set of criteria we regard as controlling (it does
not matter what they are) tells us that P is the one who should bear
the costs of the parties' interaction-in other words, that D ought to
be held nonliable. The court may carry out that judgment by as-
signing the relevant entitlement to D, as a Hohfeldian privilege. How-
ever, it doesn't have to do it that way, and that is the insight
represented by Calabresi and Melamed's Rule 4. The court can hold
D nonliable and P liable even while leaving P invested with a claim-
right for the future (thus denying D the correlative privilege), as long
as it makes P compensate D in cash for D's resulting loss. If, however,
the latter alternative is chosen, then we are back to the situation
where a further choice has to be made, again on the basis of some
adequately decisive criterion, about whether P's bought-and-paid-for
claim-right entitlement is to be one that's specifically enforceable or
rather one that's enforceable only by suits for damages.
Calabresi and Melamed, I conclude, saw symmetry where (for the
moment) I have detected asymmetry because, in constructing their
table they did not attend sufficiently to the distinctness of two ques-
tions, those of liability placement and entitlement placement. Over-
looking the deviance of Rule 4, they assumed that entitlement follows
nonliability. I have been suggesting that, while this indeed is so when
the party held nonliable is the plaintiff (meaning the one who will be
left holding the bag if there is no lawsuit), it is not so when the party
held nonliable is the defendant. When liability is assigned to the
plaintiff, then either an entitlement in the form of a privilege is as-
signed to the defendant with only one attendant possible form of rem-
edy-dismissal of the plaintiffs case-or a counter-entitlement in the
form of a claim-right is assigned to the plaintiff who, as the party being
held liable, is required to make the defendant financially whole by a
cash transfer. Either of those choices carries out a decision that the
59. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
2005]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
plaintiff ought to be the cost-bearer. 6' The choices differ, though, in
that one of them leaves P with a claim-right heading into the future
(although D's past conduct is treated as privileged), while the other
leaves D with a privilege for all time.61 The apparent result is that
there are two possible entitlement/remedy packages when defendants
are held liable, but three possible packages when plaintiffs are held
liable. Two plus three makes five.
B. Six
Five is prime, a defiantly asymmetrical number. We cannot get
back to four. If we want to reestablish symmetry, we shall have to raise
the bid to six. And, folks, I am here to tell you that there have to be
six. A properly articulated table shows this to be so:
D's Liability = P's Nonliability
Ps Liability = D's Nonliability
Ps Claim-Right Protected by a injunction against x- compensated
(Entitlement in P) Property Rule pollution on D's land restrictive real
(Rule 1) covenant, specifically
enforced (Rule 4)
Protected by a damages for x- compensated
Liability Rule pollution on D's land restrictive real
(Rule 2) covenant, damages
for breach (Rule 5)
D's Privilege [something missing] case dismissed
(Entitlement in D) (Rule 3)
TABLE El
How did we get from Table D to Table El? The answer is that
something is screwy in Table D, and Table El repairs the defect. The
trouble with Table D is that it forces us into expressions such as "D is
nonliable protected by a property rule," or "P is nonliable protected
by a liability rule," which make no clear sense. "Protection" of these
60. No doubt, there will be inevitable inaccuracies of measurement of the compensa-
tion required to make Dwhole in case the controlling considerations dictate assignment of
both the cost burden and the entitlement to P. The fact thatjudicially assessed compensa-
tion can only be approximately accurate does not mean that its award fails to carry out a
considered decision to place cost-bearing liability on P, not D. Cf Calabresi & Melamed,
The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1108 (explaining that "benefits taxes" can be justified when
the case is that the taxes "do not accurately measure each individual's desire for the bene-
fit," but "the market alternative seems worse").
61. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 446 ("From the standpoint of efficiency, a
judge should (if possible) assign the entitlement . .. such that it ends up in the hands of
that party.., who values it most (or can do without it at least cost). From the standpoint of
justice, the judge should assign the entitlement such that it starts out in the hands of the
party who is most deserving in light of the applicable justice norm .... .").
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kinds is attachable only to Hohfeldian entitlements of a certain class,
namely, the class of claim-rights, and we have seen that the choice of
entitlement assignments is detachable from the choice of liability as-
signments. Our task, then, is to reconstruct the table in a form that
conveys graphically the detachability of each of the three sets of
choices that Cathedral-style policy analysis requires: (1) the choice of
which party bears the cost burden ("is liable"); (2) the choice of which
party is to have the entitlement going forward in time from the close
of the lawsuit (P's claim-right or D's privilege); and (3) in case, but
only in case, choice (2) is for P's claim-right, the choice between pro-
tecting that claim-right by a property rule and protecting it by a liabil-
ity rule. Thus, Table El.
But Table El reveals that something still is missing. There is no
entry yet in the lower-left cell of what has now become a three-row-by-
two-column, six-cell table. If we follow the deductive method of The
Cathedral, we must "predict" a sixth rule to feed that cell.6 2 Now, what
rule possible could do so? What rule could possibly deny P both a
claim to stop the conduct of x-pollution of D's land and a claim to
compensation from D for harms to be suffered in consequence of x-
pollution conducted on D's land, and yet carry out a judgment that
not Pbut D is the one who should shoulder the costs corresponding to
those harms? Clued by The Cathedrals discovery of Rule 4, we can
detect the answer, which is: judicial investment of D with a permanent,
affirmative easement to x-pollute regardless of any resulting, future
impairment of P's use and enjoyment of nearby land, for which D will
be required now to pay to P a judicially assessed, compensatory sum of
money.
D's liability = P's liability -
P's nonliability D's nonliability
Ps Claim-Right Protected by a injunction against x- compensated
(Entitlement in P) Property Rule pollution on D's land restrictive real
(Rule 1) covenant, specifically
enforceable (Rule 4)
Protected by a damages for x- compensated
Liability Rule pollution on D's land restrictive real
(Rule 2) covenant, damages
for breach (Rule 5)
D's Privilege compensated case dismissed
(Entitlement in D) affirmative easement (Rule 3)
(Rule 6)
TABLE E2
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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But, you may ask, are there really six distinct rules here? What, in
practice, is the difference between Rule 2 and Rule 6? Under both
Rule 2 and Rule 6, D gets to x-pollute and P gets to be compensated by
D for the resulting losses, in judicially determined amounts. Never-
theless, it proves useful to pry Rules 2 and 6 apart, as the sixfold Table
E2 forces us to do. Doing so helps us see that "damages" (unmodi-
fied) is too gross a term for use in a Calabresian compilation of the
arsenal of remedies available to private-law adjudicators in pollution
cases where the liability (cost-bearing) decision goes against a pol-
luter. Let us suppose the judge in such a case has rejected injunctive
relief for the plaintiff, on allocative grounds learned from Calabresi
and Melamed.63 Having done so, that allocation-minded judge still
faces the choice between permanent and periodic damages. Rule 6
represents a solution in which D pays to P permanent (lump-sum)
damages in exchange for a privilege to x-pollute of indefinite duration
(i.e., an "easement in fee simple"),64 whereas Rule 2 represents a solu-
tion in which D's future x-polluting is nonprivileged (although also
non-enjoinable), and accordingly is exposed to an indefinite series of
periodic, retrospective damages claims asserted by p. 65 For a judge
seeking, Calabresi-style, to economize on the sum of pollution costs,
avoidance costs, transaction costs, and information costs, the choice
between those two solutions quite evidently is one that demands
66attention.
63. See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 2, at 1106-07 (explaining and
illustrating that use of a liability rule instead of a property rule may be beneficial because
the liability rule overcomes prohibitive transaction costs of bargaining around a property
rule).
64. For examples, consider the ditch easement, anti-checkerboard easement, and
"easement by necessity" instances described and discussed by Smith, Property Rules, supra
note 13, at 1737-38.
65. Of course, res judicata rules regarding claim-splitting will have to be shaped
accordingly.
66. For example, Rule 2 solutions are facially less vulnerable than Rule 6 solutions-
and to that extent less prone to being rejected in favor of a property-rule alternative-to
the objection that, whereas property rules allow for "waiting and seeing" about currently
undeveloped values that a nuisance-like affliction of land might impair, "liability rules
share with market transactions the feature of settling up now," thus requiring public valua-
tions of the plaintiffs asset now, even though "[t]he optimal time for this determination
may be in the future." Smith, Property Rules, supra note 13, at 1763.
I pass by the question, highlighted by some commentators, whether the Rule 6 solu-
tion is (a) imposed by the judge regardless of the preference of either party, (b) offered by
the judge to the plaintiff as an optional alternative to Rule I or Rule 2 (a so-called "put"
variation), (c) offered by the judge to the defendant as an optional alternative to Rule 1 or
Rule 2 (a so-called "call" variation), or (d) offered by the judge as an optional alternative to
Rule I or Rule 2, available only if both parties prefer it (a so-called "dual-option" varia-
tion). See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 27, at 34-37. A like set of possibilities attends Rules
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IV. THREE AT LAST!
Now allow me to propose one further permutation of the table:
Entitlement Coupled Entitlement Decoupled
to Nonliability from Nonliability
P's Claim-Right Protected by injunction against x- compensated restrictive
(Entitlement in P) Property Rule pollution on D's land real covenant,
(Rule 1) specifically enforceable
(Rule 4)
Protected by pay-as-you go damages compensated restrictive
Liability Rule for x-pollution on D's real covenant, periodic
land (Rule 2) damages for breach
(Rule 5)
D's Privilege case dismissed (Rule 3) lump-sum compensated
(Entitlement in D) easement (Rule 6)
TABLE F
This version clearly discloses the sense in which my initial bid of
three rules is closer to the truth than Calabresi and Melamed's bid of
four. Their fourth rule, it turns out, is a harbinger of a group of three
(Rules 4, 5, and 6) that compose an exact match for my initial three.
Each of the three rows of Table F covers one of three, basic remedial
possibilities in a pollution case-two for when P holds the entitlement
as a claim-right and one for when D holds the entitlement as a privi-
lege. In each row, both of the two entries name or point to exactly the
same remedial response when the next case comes to court. The sole
difference between the two entries in any row is that right-hand en-
tries cover cases of entitlements awarded to holders who simultane-
ously are being held liable for cost-bearing, whereas the left-hand
entries cover cases of entitlements awarded to holders who simultane-
ously are being held nonliable.
When the dust has settled, therefore, I think the correct answer
to the question posed by Calabresi and Melamed is "two matching sets
of three rules, totaling to six."67
Okay, but so what? In our traversal of the path from three to four
(two times two) to five to six (two times three), what useful under-
standing has been gained? We have brought to the visible surface of
the tabulation a choice between permanent and periodic damages
that appears to merit notice by Cathedral-style policy analysis. Is that
all? Does our armchair digging turn up anything deeper?
4 and 5. See id. In effect, I am treating each of Rules 4, 5, and 6 as a placeholder for a
package of four Rules-4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 4(d), etc.
67. Note that I have adduced six rules without any reference to "put-option" rules in-
cluded in the sixfold table presented by Ayres & Goldbart, id. at 6.
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I began by linking The Cathedral to Hohfeld, 68 even as I took note
of a perception in prior scholarship of a mismatch between Cathedral-
talk and Hohfeld-talk.6 9 I want to end by noting how our work here
confirms the perception and by suggesting a pragmatic explanation
for the mismatch.
The world according to Hohfeld displays a relentlessly duple
structure. Everything, really, is contained within two, similarly
structured pairs of conversely advantaged positions: claim-right/privi-
lege, power/immunity.7" By assigning names to the negations or
"opposites" of these four-no-right/duty, disability/liability-the
Hohfeldian lexicon enables the construction of two, parallel, fourfold
tables of 'jural correlatives" and 'jural opposites,"" but these "oppo-
sites" are inessential. The two converse pairs of claim-right/privilege
and power/immunity cover all the conceptual material this universe
contains. In fact, to get really reductive about it, the Hohfeldian uni-
verse contains two substantive elements only-claim-right and
power-considering that privilege can be derived from claim-right,
and immunity from power (or, in either case, vice-versa) by purely
formal operations of denial and negation.7 2 The Hohfeldian world,
to repeat, is duple to the core.
In the view of it I have offered here, The Cathedrals world is or-
ganized by threes, not twos. Its structure is triple, not duple. The Ca-
thedral's world thus is not only trans-Hohfeldian, in the sense that it
churns up instrumental questions that Hohfeld-talk can handle only
awkwardly at best," it is non-Hohfeldian in the profounder sense that
the two systems display radically disparate organizing structures. Be-
hind this disparity, I suggest, lies an equally radical disparity in the
respective cash-values or pragmatic cores of the two systems, to which
their remarkable staying powers in our jurisprudential culture doubt-
less are attributable.
Hohfeld's system works beautifully to lay bare the ineluctable
component of policy choice in every possible legal decision. There
68. See supra text accompanying note 29.
69. See supra note 30.
70. In calling the positions "conversely advantaged," I mean that where one of the
advantaged positions is, its converse is not. Claim-right contradicts congruent privilege,
immunity contradicts congruent power.
71. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 30.
72. "D holds a privilege as against P to x" is exactly equivalent to "P does not hold a
claim-right against D that D not x." There is nothing that the term "privilege" enables us to
say that cannot be said using only "claim-right" (or vice-versa), as long as we also have
available the notions of denial and negation. The same relation of converse equivalence
holds between "power" and "immunity."
73. See supra note 30.
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are no free lunches. To expand license ("privilege," "immunity") is,
always and necessarily, to constrict security ("claim-right," "power"),
and vice-versa. At every turn, bar none, the law-sayer, willy-nilly, sets
one competing socioeconomic interest at relative advantage and an-
other at relative disadvantage, when the choice might have been dif-
ferent had the policy preference (including justice) been different or
had the related assessment of consequences been different. That is
the lesson that latter-day consumers of Hohfeld especially cherish in
his teaching."4 What is on one's mind while doing Hohfeld is not how
law most deftly can be deployed to serve a more-or-less complex set of
posited societal goals (such as efficiency under certain constraints of
distribution and "other justice"), it is how legal rule-choices inevitably
favor and disfavor contending socioeconomic interests. The focus, ac-
cordingly, is entirely on winning and losing, not at all on the niceties
of remedy. (The Cathedrals conflation of liability placement with enti-
tlement placement is what we may call its Hohfeldian slip.) Both the
Hohfeldian system's relentlessly duple construction and its opacity to
remedy-talk are a reflection of what it is there to do.
The view from The Cathedral is different. From The Cathedral we
view law, not in its aspect of a field of struggle for life,75 but rather in
its aspect of a forum of public-minded, policy-analytic intelligence. In
the view from The Cathedral, society's aims are set (granting that their
exact contours and means of implementation remain in many re-
spects debatable): efficiency, fair distribution, "other justice." Law is a
chief medium through which these aims are better and worse served.
In their service, the law-inescapably-has the task of assigning cost-
bearing responsibility ("liability") for problematic interactions of the
sort presented by nuisance cases. But so, in such cases, has the law the
task-the distinct task-of selecting the remedial consequence of fu-
ture iterations of the contested activity. And regarding future itera-
tions there are, in the view from The Cathedral, typically three basic
remedial options, not two, from which the law must make its choice:
(1) leaving the contested activity unscathed; (2) making repetitions
unlawful, suppressible, and punishable acts ("injunction"); or (3) per-
mitting repetitions while requiring compensatory payment for result-
ing harms to others ("damages"). Insofar as we thus lock in on
74. E.g., Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 1058-59. Early consumers, too. See Walter
Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle For Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918);
Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 365 ("[T]he motivation behind the realists' fascination
with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political. They sought to undermine the
notion that property is a natural right ...
75. See Cook, supra note 74.
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remedy (which is to say, on policy), and insofar as we thus think in
terms of three, the Hohfeldian conceptual universe cannot contain
our thought. Three into two won't go.
